

8 June 2026

The Chairman
Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA)
ECNBA Secretariat
NBA House, 9 Oro Ago Street
Garki, Abuja

Dear Sir,

RE: URGENT CONCERNS REGARDING THE APPOINTED SERVICE PROVIDERS AND THE VOTER AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE 20 JULY 2026 NATIONAL ELECTIONS

I am a candidate for the office of President of the Nigerian Bar Association (the "NBA") in the national elections of the NBA (the "NBA Elections") scheduled to hold on 20 July 2026 under your leadership as Chairman of the ECNBA. It is in that capacity that I write to you.

I commend the Committee for the considerable work it has put into preparing for the forthcoming elections, including the engagement of service providers and the publication of the Step-by-Step Electronic Voting Guide for the guidance of members. It is, however, precisely because of the gravity of the responsibility the Committee bears, and the institutional consequences of every decision it takes in the run-up to 20 July 2026, that I am compelled to bring two distinct but related concerns formally to your attention.

The first concerns the corporate standing, capacity and track record of the entities the Committee has engaged as the Electronic Voting Service Provider and as the Data Protection Officer for the elections. The second concerns a material deviation between what was assured by the ECNBA at the most recent Candidates' Meeting on voter authentication, and what is now reflected in the published Step-by-Step Electronic Voting Guide. I address each in turn.

1. Corporate Standing, Capacity and Track Record of the Engaged Service Providers

Following the announcement of the appointed service providers, I commissioned a routine due diligence exercise at the Corporate Affairs Commission in respect of both entities. The results of that exercise raise serious questions which the Committee, in fairness to itself and to the integrity of the process, should be invited to address before the elections proceed any further.

1.1 Mikrodigital Connect (Appointed Electronic Voting Service Provider)

The Status Report issued by the Corporate Affairs Commission on 3 June 2026 confirms the following facts in respect of Mikrodigital Connect:

- (a)** the entity is registered as a *Business Name*, not a limited liability company. It carries Business Name Number 3022299, with Mr Shamsuddeen Haruna as its sole proprietor;
- (b)** its principal business activity is broadly described as "*Information Service Activities*", with no specific competence in electronic voting, election management technology, or large-scale identity verification reflected on the register; and
- (c)** the Due Date of Accounts on the public record is 22 November 2020. Records of payment indicate that six successive years of statutory annual returns (2020 through 2025) were paid in rapid succession between the late evening of 31 May 2026 and the early afternoon of 1 June 2026, that is to say, in the days immediately preceding or coinciding with the announcement of the appointment. The full sequence of payments, by date and time, is set out below.

Annual Return for 2020: paid 31 May 2026 at 22:06.

Annual Return for 2021: paid 1 June 2026 at 11:50.

Annual Return for 2022: paid 1 June 2026 at 11:56.

Annual Return for 2023: paid 1 June 2026 at 12:04.

Annual Return for 2024: paid 1 June 2026 at 12:20.

Annual Return for 2025: paid 1 June 2026 at 12:30.

These facts taken together raise three concerns of substance that cannot, with respect, be brushed aside.

First, on legal form. A sole proprietorship is not a separate legal personality. The undertaking, the liabilities, the contractual obligations and the data protection responsibilities all rest personally on Mr Haruna. In an exercise of this magnitude, in which the NBA will entrust the integrity of a national election, the voter roll, the credentials of every member who votes, and the technical infrastructure of the count to a single contracting party, the absence of corporate form is not a technicality. It is a material risk to the Association. Should anything go wrong, the recourse available to the NBA and to its members would be markedly different from, and weaker than, the recourse that would be available against a properly capitalised limited liability company.

Second, on corporate compliance. The pattern of payment of annual returns shown above is a serious governance red flag. An entity that has, on the face of the register, been in continuous default of its statutory annual returns for six consecutive years, and which only regularised its position in the hours immediately surrounding the award of a contract of this importance, cannot be said to demonstrate the standard of institutional discipline and regulatory hygiene that a national election service provider must meet. The timing speaks for

itself. It will inevitably invite, and deserve, the question whether the appointment preceded basic statutory compliance, or whether basic statutory compliance was an afterthought triggered by the appointment.

Third, on track record. I have caused enquiries to be made and have not been able to identify any prior engagement in which Mikrodigital Connect has independently delivered a secure electronic election at, or anywhere near, the scale, complexity and stakes of the NBA Elections. The NBA Elections are not a small undertaking. They involve tens of thousands of geographically dispersed voters with varying levels of technological familiarity, real-time identity verification, audit trails capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny, and a result that must be defensible against any subsequent challenge. The history of our own elections in 2016 and 2018, and 2024, which were mired in controversy, with one resulting in litigation and the other in arrests and prosecution, ought to remind us that the consequences of choosing the wrong service provider are neither hypothetical nor recoverable after the fact.

1.2 Thanelinc Nigeria Limited (Appointed Data Protection Officer)

In respect of Thanelinc Nigeria Limited, the Corporate Affairs Commission records confirm that the entity is registered as a limited liability company under RC Number 1481928, that it was incorporated on 23 March 2018, and that its statutory annual returns are up to date. To that extent, it meets a basic standard of corporate hygiene that, regrettably, the Electronic Voting Service Provider does not.

Beyond that, however, the position is not reassuring. The company has an authorised share capital of 1,000,000 ordinary shares and only two directors and shareholders, Ms Olufunmilayo Emore and Mr Ogho Emore, holding 500,000 shares each. Its registered objects do not include data protection, privacy compliance or election integrity work. They describe a general business support, training, mobile and web applications, and general trading enterprise. There is no indication on the public record that the company is registered with the Nigeria Data Protection Commission as a Data Protection Compliance Organisation, nor any indication of certification in the specialised domain that the role of Data Protection Officer for a national professional election requires.

Most importantly, and at the level of substance rather than form, I am not aware of any verifiable track record on the part of Thanelinc Nigeria Limited in managing the data protection and compliance architecture for an electronic election of this volume and complexity. The role of the Data Protection Officer in a national election is not a generic compliance assignment. It calls for demonstrated experience with high-volume processing of sensitive personal data, with breach response at scale, with cross-border data flow assessment where cloud infrastructure is involved, and with the kind of contemporaneous, defensible record-keeping that any subsequent regulatory or judicial inquiry will demand. None of this is evident on the face of the available material.

1.3 The Underlying Concern

I should make it clear that none of what I have written above is intended as a personal attack on Mr Haruna, on Ms Emore, on Mr Emore, or indeed on the firms they own. They may be entirely competent in the markets they ordinarily serve. The issue is one of fit, and of institutional risk management. The NBA is the umbrella body of more than two hundred thousand legal practitioners. The election it conducts on 20 July 2026 will shape the leadership of the Bar for years to come and may, depending on how the process unfolds, end up before the courts. The Committee owes it to the Association and to the membership to be able to demonstrate, on the face of the record, that the providers it has engaged were chosen for their demonstrated capacity to carry out a mandate of this size, not merely their availability or their willingness to bid.

Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Committee, in the spirit of transparency it has previously affirmed, provide the following:

- (a)** the full technical and corporate proposals submitted by Mikrodigital Connect and Thanelinc Nigeria Limited;
- (b)** the criteria applied by the Committee in evaluating those proposals, and the comparative assessment of any competing bids;
- (c)** particulars of any prior elections, of comparable scale, conducted or supported by either entity, with the names of the engaging bodies for verification;
- (d)** in respect of Thanelinc Nigeria Limited, confirmation of its registration status with the Nigeria Data Protection Commission and any relevant professional certifications held by its principals; and
- (e)** the indemnity, insurance and performance security arrangements in place under the engagement contracts, given the corporate form and capital base of the two providers.

2. Deviation from the Assured Voter Authentication Framework

2.1 What was assured

At the Candidates' Meeting convened by the ECNBA on 25 May 2026, the Committee, the candidates and the other stakeholders present reached a clear and shared understanding that the National Identification Number (NIN) would be integrated into the voter authentication process for the 20 July 2026 elections. That understanding was not casual. It was reached in the express context of identity fraud risks witnessed in previous Bar elections and the corresponding need to layer authentication so that no single compromised credential could deliver a fraudulent vote. The integration of NIN was the layer that was intended to give the process robustness against impersonation, against credential sharing and against bulk credential compromise.

2.2 What the Step-by-Step Guide now says

The Step-by-Step Electronic Voting Guide subsequently released by the ECNBA makes no mention of NIN. The authentication path it describes relies on the Supreme Court Enrolment Number (SCN) and a standard One-Time Password (OTP) sent to a registered contact. There is no second factor anchored in a verified national identity layer. There is no provision for cross-checking the SCN-OTP combination against the National Identity Management Commission database, or any equivalent independent identity source.

You may also wish to know that the SCN of any lawyer is not in any form or way a unique independent means of identification for the simple reason that the members and staff of the NBA Secretariat have the SCN of every lawyer that has paid their Bar practicing fees for any given year.

2.3 Why this matters

With respect, the difference between what was assured and what has been published is not a drafting omission. It is a substantive change to the security posture of the election.

The SCN is a professional registration number. It is not a secret. It appears on call-to-bar records, on practice documents, on stamps and seals, on email signatures and on countless filings that pass through court registries every day. A determined bad actor seeking to compromise the election can obtain SCN numbers in volume with comparatively little effort. The protection in the proposed framework therefore rests almost entirely on the OTP. OTPs themselves, however, are routinely compromised through SIM swap fraud, through social engineering, through compromised email accounts, and through interception. Without a unique independent identity layer behind the SCN and the OTP, the framework reduces to a one-factor system in any case where the OTP delivery channel is compromised.

This is precisely the risk that the integration of NIN was designed to mitigate. NIN ties authentication to a biometrically anchored national identity. A person attempting to vote with another lawyer's SCN, even if they have somehow received that lawyer's OTP, cannot easily satisfy a NIN-bound check. Dropping that layer therefore does not simplify the process. It weakens it materially.

2.4 What I respectfully ask

In the circumstances, I respectfully ask the Committee to do three things, without delay.

First, to confirm in writing whether the assurances given at the Candidates' Meeting on the integration of NIN into the voter authentication process remains extant, and if not, on what basis and on what date the change was made.

Second, to clarify whether the NIN integration has been deferred, dropped, or rendered impossible by a technical or institutional constraint, and if the latter, to disclose the nature of that constraint so that candidates can engage with it on its merits.

Third, to take immediate steps to restore the assured NIN authentication layer in the published Step-by-Step Electronic Voting Guide, or, in the alternative, to convene a further meeting of the candidates at the earliest opportunity at which any proposed substitute authentication architecture can be examined, tested and agreed in advance of the elections.

3. Conclusion

I have written this letter in the spirit of constructive engagement. I have no wish to obstruct the work of the Committee, nor to inflame what is already a tense moment in the life of the Association. I do, however, have an obligation, both as a candidate and as a member of the Bar, to insist that the elections of 20 July 2026 are conducted on a footing that the membership of this Association, and the courts of this country if it should come to that, will recognise as fit for purpose.

The matters set out above are not academic. The corporate form, compliance history and track record of the appointed service providers, and the authentication architecture published in the Step-by-Step Guide, will be among the very first matters scrutinised in the event of any post-election dispute. It is far better and wiser that they be addressed now, openly and on the record, than being addressed later in litigation.

I therefore respectfully request a substantive response, in writing, within five working days (given the closeness of the election date) of the date of this letter. I remain available to meet with the Committee at any time of its choosing to discuss these matters in further detail and in good faith.

Please accept the assurances of my highest professional regard.

Yours faithfully,



Lateef Omoyemi Akangbe, SAN
Candidate, Office of the President
Nigerian Bar Association