BY FATAI ABIODUN

Clearing Misconception about the Jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court over Human Trafficking

Recently, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Jos Judicial Division, presided over by Hon. Justice Ibrahim Galadima, convicted Victoria Ugwu, Rita Agboeze (Satty) and Prophetess Glory Nwachukwu for trafficking children and sentenced them to two years’ imprisonment and ₦250,000 fine each.

This is not the first time the Industrial Court would be sentencing a convict on a human trafficking offence. In Attorney-General of the Federation v. Magnus Iheanacho Suit No. NICN/ABJ/162/2013. Magnus Iheanacho was prosecuted over the taking of a 12-year-old girl, Eucharia Uka, from her parents under the pretext that she would assist in caring for children in his household. The original prosecution had commenced before the Federal High Court, but the matter was transferred to the National Industrial Court on 23 May 2013 pursuant to an order of Justice A. Abdu-Kafarati, of blessed memory, in light of the jurisdictional position at the time. Justice Lifu subsequently heard the matter at the NICN. Justice Lifu expressly connected the case to the constitutional jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. In discussing the child abuse involved, he referred to section 254C(1)(i) and (5) of the Constitution, observing that the sexual abuse constituted child abuse criminalised by the constitutional framework and the convict was sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment.

In Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Ogierakhi Joyce Amenze (a.k.a. Mama Blossom), Suit No. NICN/BEN/1C/2021, Justice Adunola Adewemimo of the National Industrial Court, Benin Division, convicted the defendant for trafficking-related offences. The case involved the recruitment of adult women for prostitution in South Africa.

Similarly, in FRN v. Fatima Joy Odiri Joseph, NICN/BEN/1C/2022, the defendant, Fatima Joseph, was prosecuted by NAPTIP for trafficking two 14-year-old girls from Benin City to Burkina Faso for prostitution. The prosecution’s case was that she recruited the two girls of 14 years old in Benin City and facilitated their movement to her brother in Burkina Faso, where they were to be sexually exploited. This places the case squarely within the protective purpose of the trafficking legislation and the constitutional concern with child abuse and human trafficking.

However, following the recent convictions of Victoria Ugwu, Rita Agboeze (Satty) and Prophetess Glory Nwachukwu in Jos Division, there appears to be a misconception among some members of the legal profession that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, being principally associated with labour and employment disputes, lacks jurisdiction to try offences of human trafficking. This position overlooks the constitutional transformation of the Court’s jurisdiction by the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution.

I had this argument with a colleague of mine in Law School when he posited that the National Industrial Court is a labour court with only civil jurisdiction. I quickly drew his attention to the Constitutional provision that grants the court criminal jurisdiction, with the understanding that few universities in Nigeria offer Labour law as a course in the Law faculty. This has a significant impact on the issue of understanding of NICN under the current dispensation. The first point of contact for many lawyers on issues bordering on trafficking is the Federal High Court without looking attentively to the issues as to the fact of the case. The Third Alteration to the Constitution became a game changer. Special thanks to the founding fathers.

The father of the modern National Industrial Court, Justice Babatunde Adejumo (Rtd) posited that the jurisdiction of the modern NICN cannot be determined solely by reference to its historical identity as a labour court or by the pre-Third Alteration limitations of the National Industrial Court Act. Justice Adejumo succinctly stated that where the Constitution expressly places matters such as child labour, child abuse and human trafficking within section 254C(1)(i), and section 254C(5) expressly confers criminal jurisdiction in causes and matters arising from the constitutionally assigned subject matters, the Court possesses the constitutional competence to exercise that jurisdiction, subject always to the particular charge falling within the prescribed constitutional subject matter.

The President of the National Industrial Court, Justice Benedict Kanyip posited that the Court’s jurisdiction should be determined by the subject matter of the dispute, rather than mechanically asking whether there is a conventional employer–employee contract. Justice Kanyip’s broader approach to section 254C supports the proposition that the provision must be read according to its actual constitutional language, rather than according to the historical name of the Court.

It is important to state that Section 254C(1)(i) expressly confers jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court in matters “connected with or related to child labour, child abuse, human trafficking or any matter connected therewith or related thereto.”

Human trafficking is therefore not merely an incidental matter to labour disputes but an expressly recognised head of the Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The recent decision in The People of Plateau State v. Victoria Ugwu demonstrates this position, as the Court upheld its jurisdiction to entertain a charge of human trafficking under section 13 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015.

In Mr. Afamefuna Nwankwo v. Onitsha South Transport Company Ltd & Ors, Suit No. NICN/EN/23/2020, judgment delivered 6 August 2024, Justice Oluwakayode Arowosegbe gave a broad interpretation of the constitutional transformation brought about by the Third Alteration. His Lordship observed that the NICN’s jurisdiction is not confined to conventional employer-versus-employee disputes. In discussing the constitutional provisions, Justice Arowosegbe stated that the inclusion of child labour, child abuse and human trafficking in section 254C(1)(i) demonstrates the expansive character of the jurisdiction conferred on the NICN by the Third Alteration Act.

However, the decision in The People of Plateau State v. Rita Agboeze (Satty) equally demonstrates that the constitutional jurisdiction should not be interpreted as conferring unlimited criminal jurisdiction over every offence created by the TIPPEA Act. The proper approach is to examine the precise offence charged and determine whether it falls within the subject matter expressly assigned to the National Industrial Court by section 254C. The debate, therefore, is not whether the National Industrial Court is a “labour court” incapable of trying criminal offences, but whether the particular criminal charge falls within the constitutional boundaries of its jurisdiction.

In The People of Plateau State v. Victoria Ugwu, NICN/JOS/CR/2/2025, the defence relied on section 36(1) of the TIPPEA Act, arguing that jurisdiction over offences under the Act was vested in the High Court. It therefore contended that bringing the human-trafficking charge before the NICN was improper. The Court held that once human trafficking is within the subject-matter jurisdiction of section 254C(1)(i), section 254C(5) supplies the constitutional basis for the Court’s criminal jurisdiction over that subject matter. His Lordship’s conclusion was unequivocal: “Human trafficking, particularly where children are involved, falls squarely within the constitutional remit of this Court.”

Justice Galadima did not treat trafficking simply as the physical movement of a person from one place to another. His Lordship’s approach identifies three broad components: an act – recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt; a prohibited means – threat, force, coercion, deception, abuse of power or payment; and an exploitative purpose – the intention that the person be exploited.

Justice Galadima rejected the proposition that “If the parents voluntarily gave the child away, there cannot be trafficking.” His lordship’s reasoning was that consent obtained through deception does not legitimise the underlying fraudulent conduct. The fact that a parent physically hands over a child voluntarily does not necessarily eliminate trafficking where the consent was induced by deception. This position is potentially an important precedent for future child-trafficking prosecutions.

In conclusion, the proposition that the National Industrial Court is merely a “labour court” incapable of trying human-trafficking offences is no longer sustainable when measured against the constitutional text, the judicial history of the Court and its developing jurisprudence. The more accurate legal question is not whether the NICN is a labour court, but whether the particular criminal charge falls within the subject-matter jurisdiction expressly conferred upon the Court by section 254C of the Constitution. On that formulation, human trafficking occupies a unique position because the Constitution itself expressly names it as a matter within the Court’s jurisdiction.

• Fatai Abiodun is a Legal Practitioner and Constitutional/Developmental Law Researcher. He can be reached at fatai.abiodun200709@gmail.com

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